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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [UK](#) [AORC](#) [PTER](#) [PINR](#)

SUBJECT: DOE REQUEST FOR ASSURANCES IN ORDER TO TRANSFER
URANIUM IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS EXERCISE

11. (U) DOE REQUEST FOR ASSURANCES: We wish to inform post that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has sent a request for assurances to Claire Bloomfield at the British Embassy in Washington (para 4) to facilitate the Atomic Weapons Establishment's (AWE) request to participate in a nuclear forensics exercise in support of the International Technical Working Group (ITWG) on Nuclear Smuggling. The exercise will involve the transfer of between 10-14 grams highly enriched uranium under a contract with the United States Department of Energy (DOE) to an AWE facility. Title will transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the laboratory's exclusive use during the ITWG exercise. Because the AWE laboratory is not considered an eligible facility for international safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the DOE has requested, through the British Embassy, that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland provide assurances to the DOE that the nuclear material will be used only for peaceful uses and exclusively for the purpose of this sampling exercise. Without such assurances, DOE cannot enter into a contract with the AWE laboratory to supply the highly enriched uranium for receipt, sampling and analytical analysis and reporting. No post action is required at this time; this cable is for informational purposes.

12. (U) FOI POINT OF CONTACT: Paul Thompson, Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, RG7 4PR, United Kingdom.

13. (U) ITWG BACKGROUND: Chartered in 1996 by the G-8, the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is an international group of policy and decision makers, law enforcement personnel, and scientists with expertise in, and responsibility for, nuclear forensics. The group is co-chaired by U.S. and European Union (EU) experts and includes members from more than 20 countries that have been nominated by their governments on the basis of their expertise in different facets of nuclear forensics. The objective of the ITWG is to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear material by promoting international cooperation in the field of nuclear forensics, particularly with regard to supporting prosecutions of smugglers. To this end, the ITWG has adopted a general framework to guide nuclear forensics investigations which includes: recommendations for nuclear crime scene security and analysis, the best application of radio-analytical methods, the conduct of traditional forensic analysis of contaminated materials, and effective data analysis to interpret the history of seized nuclear materials. These techniques have been adopted by experts in many nations (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Turkey, others) as they respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking. These multilateral efforts directly support the principles and mission of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism which also seeks to share expertise and best practices.

14. (SBU) Begin text of letter:

Claire Bloomfield
Foreign Section
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20008

Dear Mrs. Bloomfield:

The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) has expressed an interest in participating in a nuclear forensics exercise in support of the International Technical Working Group (ITWG) on Nuclear Smuggling. The exercise will involve the transfer of between 10-14 grams highly enriched uranium under a contract with the United States Department of Energy (DOE) to their facility. Title will transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the exclusive use of participating in the ITWG exercise. Because the laboratory is not considered an eligible facility for international safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), prior to the DOE entering into a contract with the laboratory to supply the enriched uranium for receipt, sampling and analytical analysis and reporting, the United States Government requests that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland provide assurances to the DOE that the nuclear material will be used only for peaceful uses and exclusively for the purpose of this sampling exercise.

Please confirm your receipt of this notice acknowledging the facility's responsibility to use this material for peaceful uses and exclusively for the purpose of the subject ITWG exercise, and furthermore, subject to a contract with DOE, the facility will account for the nuclear material in accordance with the contract to be executed between the DOE and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. You may confirm receipt by faxing or emailing a signed copy of this form to Mr. Sean Oehlbert. He may be reached at 202-586-3806 or sean.oehlbert@nnsa.doe.gov.

Please let me know if you have any questions regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

Richard. S. Goorevich
Director
Office of International Regimes and Agreements
U.S. Department of Energy

End text of letter.
CLINTON